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Codifying the Past, Erasing the Future: NAFTA and the
Zapatista Uprising of 1994
Andy Gutierrez*
1. Introduction
Did the American people know that, in signing NAFTA, their
government had become an accomplice in genocide... that the'
indigenous people of Mexico were now condemned to death?
- SubComandante Marcos, spokesperson for
the Zapatista Army of National Liberation'
On the evening of December 31, 1993, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari
retreated to the exclusive Pacific resort in Huatulco, Oaxaca.2 There, in the company of close
family and guests, and in the final moments of his regime, Salinas no doubt pondered the novel
economic path that he had dutifully set for his countrymen. During his sexenio (six-year term),
Salinas had done no less than retrench the entire revolutionary course of Mexican history: he had
overseen the mass privatization of Mexican industry; the slashing of public-sector spending; but,
above all, he had "liberated" his country from the clutches of decades-old state protectionism by
signing NAFA.3 Hence, as the countdown to the midnight hour quickened, Mexico's first
family and chosen guests, "raised glasses of Dom Perignon ... to celebrate the long-awaited
arrival of NAFTA and 1994.'
Gaiety did not last long. Moments before 2:00 a.m., a military attachg "stepped
onto the terrace and handed President Salinas a card."5 General Antonio Reveillo Bazan,
*J.D. 1997, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The author wishes
to express special thanks to Christine Ann Tyler for her inspiration and support.
I. SubComandante Marcos, 'What Do the American People Fear? Our Bare Feet and
Broken Bodies?', L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1995, at editorial section.
2. JOHN Ross, REBELLION FROM THE ROOTS: INDIAN UPRISING IN CHIAPAS 13 (1995).
3. " See discussion infra parts III A-B. Even though it is widely acknowledged that
Salinas won his election through fraud (the computers counting votes mysteriously
crashed when it was revealed that the opposition candidate was leading in early poll
results), he added Mexico as a NAFTA signatory in 1992. DAN LA BOTZ, DEMOCRACY IN
MEXICO: PEASANT REBELLION AND POLITICAL REFORM 109, 193-202. (1995).
4. Ross, supra note 2, at 13.
5. Id.
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the Secretary of Defense, was on the phone. "I have just spoken with the commander of the
31st Military Zone," he explained, "and he has informed me that an armed force, calling
itself the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, has entered San Cristobal de Las Casas,
Chiapas and declared war on the military and the government."6
General Bazan's nervous recantation was correct. About a ten hour's bus ride
southeast of the Presidential celebration, and in the lush highlands of the country's poorest
and most removed state, a wholly different scene played out. There, amidst the elusive
canopy of Chiapas' "foggy, wooded hills and valleys," masses of desperate Indians gathered.
Unlike their celebrating Commander-in-Chief, however, they did not wield bottles of Dom
Perignon. Instead, these "sons and daughters of poor farmers and plantation laborers," a
third of them women, swarmed upon four towns-San Cristobal de Las Casas, Ocosingo,
Altamirano, and Las Margaritas-heralding the start of Mexico's largest post-
revolutionary rebellion this century.8
With hardly any resistance and only a few pitched gun battles, the Zapatistas
managed to take control of the towns from the start.9 Within hours, however, the Mexican
Army launched a fierce counterattack. From the air they strafed villages and countryside
with rocket and machine gunfire.'" From the ground thousands of government soldiers
"conducted house-to-house" searches."
By the fifth day of the Levantamiento (Uprising), government forces had gained the
upper hand. Zapatista rebels were by then desperately trying to flee back to the Lacandon.'2
Moreover, preliminary reports indicated that the Mexican Army had resorted to gross human
rights abuses. When reporters were finally permitted into Ocosingo, the site of the fiercest
confrontation, they found "a total of 25 bodies, mainly of guerrillas but also including that of a
baby . . . strewn in the streets and buildings, particularly in the village market, where five bodies
showed signs of execution, lying face down in a row with their hands [tied] behind their backs."'3
It became increasingly clear as the days passed that the Zapatistas were ill-equipped
to do battle with a modern Army, particularly one trained and equipped by the United
States.'4 In one village market, in addition to the bodies of downed Zapatistas, reporters
6. id.
7. Indian Peasants in Southern Mexico State Storm 4 Cities, Towns, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1994, at A7.
8. See generally LA BOTZ, supra note 3, at 1-12.
9. See Id.
10. See Juanita Darling & Tracy Wilkinson, Mexican Troops Step Up Drive to Crush
Revolt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at Al.
11. Tracy Wilkinson & Juanita Darling, Thousands in Mexico march to Back Indians,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1994, at Al.
12. See Darling, supra note 10.
13. Juanita Darling, Aircraft Strafe, Bomb Fleeing Mexican Rebels, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5,
1994, at A I.
14. See Julio A. Montes, Mexican Armoured Vehicles, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Jan.
1, 1996, at 44.
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came upon a cache of crudely fabricated weaponry-"sticks carved in the shape of guns,
some with knives or corrugated metal strapped to the barrel like bayonets.'5
For many, an insurrection in Mexico's back country frontier, especially
by a group of veiled unknowns, hardly seems a befitting topic for a journal
on environmental law. One might even marvel whether inquiry into the
uprising, and the fate of its indigenous combatants, would be better served
from a human rights perspective?
Initial skepticism is understandable. Mexico and the United States
each maintain their own unique conceptions of environmentalism. But if, for
a moment, one could suppress his or her preconceived cognitive models of
environmentalism, particular to his or her country's social, economic, and
political milieu, Mexico's largest peasant rebellion takes on a different hue.
In the United States, environmentalism traditionally focuses on issues
that are de rigueur within the larger mainstream movement: i.e., pollution,
nature conservation, population control, and the protection of lower-order
species.'" Some have even gone so far as to describe "mainstream
environmentalism" as merely an "adjunct of the capitalist system" whereby
theories of sustainable development are watered down and contorted to fit
within the controlling canons of world trade and sustained economic
growth.'7 The protection of civilians from the over-arching power of police or
market forces, i.e., civil and human rights, is treated as severable - an
entirely distinct field with its own set of traditions.'8
In Mexico, by contrast, civil and human rights and concern for one's
natural living conditions are not so easily separable. There, the populace
grapples with a maddening web of basic survival and empowerment issues:
i.e. land expulsions;'9 state-sponsored death squads;" rule under one-party
dictatorship;2' mass assassinations of grassroots political opposition
15. Darling, supra note 13.
16. See TOM BARRY, ZAPATA'S REVENGE: FREE TRADE AND THE FARM CRISIS IN MEXICO
203-05 (1995).
17. See id. at 202-03.
18. See id. at 204-08.
19. See TOM BARRY, MEXICO: A COUNTRY GUIDE 67 (1992).
20. See Interview with Samuel Ruiz, Bishop of Catholic Church, in San Cristobal
de Las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico (Apr. 1994). Bishop Ruiz spoke of the Guardia Blanca
(White Guard), or hired thugs who threatened, at times, murdered those who stood
in the way of the local landed-elite.
21. "Mexicans do not live but only imagine democracy," says one prominent
Mexican historian. Quoted in BARRY supra note 19, at 1. The Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI), which has ruled Mexico for over six decades, id. at 64-5, confers
"dictatorial authority" on the President. See id. at 17. The President appoints and
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candidates;22 extreme rural child poverty and malnourishment;23 lack of
education;24 and severe economic paralysis and unemployment.25 The fates
of the Spotted Owl and Marbled Murrelet ring softly, if at all.
Given the enormous panoply of social, economic and political
obstacles facing Mexico today, and the fact that millions of peasant families
continue to survive through subsistence farming,26 any construction of
environmentalism as it applies to Mexico must necessarily incorporate
issues that transcend "Western" notions of land, air, water and species
protection issues. A more nuanced construction would take into account
core human and civil rights issues.
Mexico's small peasant farmers understand the human rights-
environmental linkage very well: 'We are campesinos. When the land is violated,
our rights are violated--our right to work, to feed ourselves, to our health and the
health of our children."27 "'The struggle for survival is now an environmental one
and it is being fought out on a very fragile stage. . . .Farmers now go to the
National Human Rights Commission because no other governmental agency will
listen to them,"' adds Mexican Greenpeace activist Roberto Lopez."
The inherent difference between First World environmentalism in the
U.S. and its people-centered counterpart in Mexico is potentially explosive.
removes the state governors; installs and dismisses leaders of Congress; and selects
whom will serve on the Supreme Court. See id.
22. See id. at 64. After Salinas took power in 1988, repression and violence
against political opposition achieved a state of near-total impunity: in Saltnas's first
three years in office, 97 leaders, members, and supporters of just one opposition
party, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), were assassinated.
23. See Guillermo Correa, Seguh el INEGI, 61.45% de la Poblacion Rural Vive en la
Pobreza, EL PROCESSO, Dec. 25, 1995, at 32 (reporting on a national study that found 67
percent of the rural population living in "extreme poverty").
24. See id. Fourteen out of every 100 rural schools do not offer the 6 grades of
primary education: twenty-two of each 100 only have one teacher; and one out of
every three Indian children do not have a preschool or primary education. Id.
25. Mexico's economy, in the last three years, has turned disastrous. One
Mexican daily headlined their country's crisis as the "worst economic crisis in 50
years." Mexico Sufre su Peor Crisis Economica en 50 Years: PRD, CUARTO PODER, Jan. 7, 1996,
at 7. In 1995, over 1.5 million Mexicans lost their jobs; the peso lost 50 percent of its
value; most major banks had to be bailed out; and the Mexican auto industry closed
with a 70 percent loss in sales and production, "one of the worst years in decades."
Anthony DePalma, at 95, Labor's King, but Party's Vassal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at A4.
26. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 103.
27. JOHN Ross, "Zapata's Children: Defending the Land and Human Rights in the
Countryside, NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICANS, Jan./Feb. 1997, at 30.
28. Id.
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Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the fields of environmental and
international trade law. When NAFTA was passed, for instance, it included the
much celebrated Supplemental Side Accords (SSAs) on the environment,
health and labor.29 Aside from smoothing the way for the Treaty's passage, the
Side Accords earned NAFTA praise for being the world's first international
trade agreement that substantively included quality-of-life values." Its key
legal criterion provides that sanctions will lie once it is shown that a NAFTA
nation suffers from a "persistent pattern of failure" to "effectively enforce" its
environmental health, or labor laws.3' Conspicuously absent from the SSAs or
NAFTA, however, was a subject dear to Mexico's millions of indigenous-
peasantry-their potential displacement from communal lands. "IMlany
people are scandalized by the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. The
current policies of the Mexican Government are not very different from this.
They want to cleanse the farmers from the countryside," said Victor Quintana,
leader of the Peasant Democratic Front.32
This cultural oversight-the complete ethnic and economic
reformation of the Mexican countryside-is unfortunate. Mexico's 3.1
million indigenous-peasant farmers are categorized as limited-surplus
producers, and including their families, number approximately 18 million."
They produce a select variety of crops such as corn, beans, cabbage, and
squash for subsistence and marketing purposes.34 Corn, however, is by far
the most important crop produced. It is estimated that 68 percent of those
employed in agriculture in Mexico and 78 percent of those engaged in
peasant communal farming are engaged in corn production.
Under NAFTA, however, the role of Mexico's indigenous-peasant
agriculture is called into doubt. They are placed in direct free-market
competition with the world's most advanced, and highly subsidized, corn-
producing nation in the world, the United States.36
29. See JACK GARVEY, Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution Under the NAFTA
Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 441 (1995).
30. See id.
31. id at 442.
32. Mexican Agriculture Policies: An Immigration Generafor?: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Employment, Housing, and Aviation of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1993).
33. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 119.
34. Interview with peasant farmers, Chamula, Chiapas and Oaxaca, Oaxaca,
Jul.-Aug. 1996.
35. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 103.
36. See Corn Commodity Description, U.S. FEED GRAINS COUNCIL, JUN. 3, 1996,
AVAILABLE IN U.S. FEED GRAINS COUNCIL HOME PAGE (revisited Jan. 12, 1997)
http://www.grains.org/usinfo/importer/chpt l/ch I corn.htm.
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Is it any wonder, then, that the Zapatista Levantamiento, which
represents Mexico's most popular grassroots peasant rebellion in recent
memory,37 launched their uprising on the inaugural date of NAFTA? They
claim that free trade under the Treaty is the equivalent of a "summary
execution order against indigenous Mexicans" and that under the accord
indigenous-peasantry will be "annihilated not with bullets or bombs but by
the silent death of disease, of penury, of abandonment."38
The historical power and divining quality of these words suggest that
the Zapatista Levantamiento goes beyond the four corners of NAFTA.
Zapatistas remind us that, at the dawn of the Twenty-First Century, Native
Americans still wage an uphill battle for the most basic of human
dignities-the right to economic and cultural self-determination.39
Seen thus from the despairing eyes of Mexico's indigenous-peasantry,
disarmed and illuminated by the cruelty of history, NAFTA ascends to fuller
meaning. More than just a novel free-trade instrument designed to spur trade and
investment, the Treaty is seen by the peasantry as the codification of their
communities' economic marginalization through mandatory participation in the
world economy. It unilaterally imposes the dominant social orthodoxy, not by
slavery as in the past, but by the economic and legal means of the present.
Believing that the post-Cold War Order, premised on an array of free-
trade accords, seeks only to protect the movement of capital and goods and
not the viability of human communities, the Zapatistas spoke for many,
including their ancestors, when they cried Basta! (Enough!)." This
indigenous defiance, aimed at the darling centerpiece of the New World
Order, ushered in the world's first organized rebellion directed specifically
against the seemingly unchecked process of free-market globalization.4'
This note assesses the claim by the Zapatista Army of National
Liberation that NAFTA is a "death certificate"42 in the context of the potential
long-term transformation of Mexico's agrarian sector under NAFTA-style free
trade. First, it examines the political-economic processes that led to Mexico's
current state of agrarian crisis, namely the "externalization" of Mexican
agriculture between 1940 and 1980, with particular attention given to the state
of Chiapas. Next, it discusses the role of global finance, in the wake of the
37. See generally LA BoTz supra note 3, at Chs. 1-2.
38. MARCOS, supra note 1.
39. See Video of Foro Especial de Derechos indigenas, convocated by the
Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Remarks of Comandante Tacho &
SubComandante Marcos) (Jan. 3-8, 1996) (on file with author).
40. See Declaration of War from the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Jan.
1, 1994).
41. See MARC COOPER, ZAPA1STAS: SPREADING HOPE FOR GRASSROOrS CHANGE, STARTING
FROM CHIAPAS, MExIco (Open Magazine Pamphlet Series, Pamphlet No. 30, Feb. 1994).
42. BARRY, supra note 16, at 157.
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1982 Third World Debt Crisis, in limiting the ways in which Mexico could
respond to its widening agrarian crisis. This part is followed by a discussion of
NAFTA and how, under the theory of relative comparative trade advantage,
Mexico's small corn producers stand to lose. The following sections then
discuss the implications for survival of Mexico's indigenous-peasantry under
the current free-trade regime and the broad rural and legal reforms necessary
to ensure their survival. Finally, the morality of unilaterally imposing free trade
on our hemisphere's native peoples is raised.
11. Seeds of Crisis: The Transformation of Mexican Agriculture
It is no surprise that Mexico witnessed a large-scale indigenous-peasan 3
revolt in the 1990s. Between 1940 and 1980, the country underwent rapid changes
in its industrial, demographic, and trade composition-changes which led to a
fundamental transformation of Mexican agriculture: dams, hydro-electric power
plants, railroads and highways were built;44 the population more than tripled,
rising from 19.6 million in 1940 to 67 million by 1977;41 urbanization, which until
then had been relatively static, took off as the proportion of people living in the
rural sector dropped from 80 to 30 percent;4 and, finally, even though agriculture
gave way to industry in terms of contribution to GDP between 1940 and 1980, the
value of Mexican agricultural exports actually increased from 4.3 millionpesos to
42 million during that same period."
43. Today, the concept of peasantry in rural Mexico is very broad. It includes, for
example, "masons, ditch diggers, truck drivers, small store owners, and tailors." GEORGE
COLLIER, BASTA!: LAND AND THE ZAPATISTA REBELLION IN CHIAPAS 90 (1994). This was not always
so. In the past, peasants were mostly confined to food production. "The vast majority of
peasant households now participate in some kind of wage work or commercial enterprise
in addition to farming." Id. Because of these changes the term "peasantry" must be
expanded to include Indians, such as "Zapatista women who want to chance to become
truck drivers," but "who still, have some ability to produce their own food" or associate
closely with people who "have some ability to produce their own food ..... Id.
Hence when speaking of indigenous people in modern Mexico, it is perhaps
more accurate to speak of an "indigenous-peasantry." Indians in Mexico have
realities that "are no longer strictly defined by food production." Id. The rapid growth
of "non-agricultural work and the increasing integration of peasant economies into
national and international markets" has created an indigenous class no longer
completely distinct from much of Mexico's wage-earning peasantry. Id.
44. See LA BOTZ, supra note 3, at 57-58 (1995).
45. See HECTOR AGUILAR GAMIN & LORENZO MEYER, IN THE SHADOW OF THE MEXICAN
REVOLUTION 162 (1993).
46. See id.
47. See STEVEN E. SANDERSON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF MEXICAN AGRICULTURE:
INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE POLITICS OF RURAL CHANGE 38 (1986).
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008
As a result of these long-term post-war changes (industrialization,
demographic shifts and insertion into the world economy), Mexican
agriculture confronted new challenges. It had to meet the enormous food
demands of a rapidly expanding population; adapt to the modern dietary
tastes that accompany urbanization; and at the same time reorient food
production to compete optimally in the international market.48 Agriculture's
focus thus shifted from production of basic food items and fresh foodstuffs
for local and national consumption to production of non-essential food
items, such as coffee, for consumption abroad. "Basic food production was
no longer the principal goal of the agricultural system," one scholar
observes, "it was geared increasingly to support agribusiness processors,
retailers, and intermediaries, whether at the international or the national level."49
Post-war externalization of Mexican food production did not bode well
for the country's indigenous-peasantry. Their small communal communities,
so highly dependent upon basic grains production for sustenance and
marketing, suffered disproportionately: first, there was the loss of cultivable
acreage to competing export commodities, such as sorghum, oats, and
alfalfa;"0 and second, there was the leveling off of national demand for
traditional peasant staple crops, such as maize and beans." This latter
process can be attributed to demographics: as the country urbanized, city
people came to "disdainII the traditional devotion to maize and beans," and
instead evinced a preference for food items "to which the peasants haldl no
access," namely meat and milk."
The "double-edged phenomenon" of loss of cultivable acreage to
export crops and reduced national demand for traditional staple crops, in
consonance with the vital nutritional role peasant-produced foods play, led
to one of the worst food crises ever to face the Mexican rural poor this
century.3 By the 1970s, Mexico became for the first time a net importer of
basic grains.4 And by 1980, it was estimated that 90 percent of the rural
population suffered from "some degree of caloric and protein deficiency.""5
Hungry, desperate and mindful of their ongoing marginalization by the
1980s, peasant groups across the country struck back. They formed independent
48. See id. at 6-11.
49. ld. at 39.
50. See BARRY supra note 19, at 159.
51. See SANDERSON supra note 47, at 214-16.
52. Id. at 228-29. Sanderson describes Mexican consumption of maize after
1940 as a matter of class preference, adding that "Imlaize is likely to continue to be a
crop produced by the poor for the poor." Id.
53. Seeid. at 8.
54. See BARRY, supra note 19, at 16.
55. SANDERSON, supra note 47, at 9.
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advocacy organizations. "These rangeldl from zapatista groups demanding a
renewal of agrarian reform, to sectorial associations fighting for their specialized
economic interests, to local groups fighting for higher prices and better access
to credit and technology."6 Non-economic demands included calls "to end
government corruption and repression by private and public security forces.""
The proliferation, 8 no less than the existence, of these groups indicated that the
Mexican countryside, by the 1980s, was a time bomb waiting to explode.
For some regions of Mexico the pulse of indigenous unrest pounded more
furiously than in others. In Chiapas, for instance, after decades of modern-
agroindustrial development between 1940 and 1980, led principally through
mass agroexports, 9 the Mexican backwater found itself imprisoned in economic
irony. It had created a macabre alloy, between high economic growth and
widespread social misery. Thomas Benjamin describes this process:
Despite the impressive economic expansion of the previous three
decades, in 1970 more than 90 percent of economically active
Chiapanecos eamed less than 1,000 pesos a month, or slightly more
than eighty dollars. Nearly 40 percent of the population was illiterate;
about 50 percent of all houses were without running water and
electricity; and 80,000 day laborers worked on fincas and plantations,
often living in huts and receiving less than the minimum wage. Chronic
alcoholism, malnutrition, and diseases such as tuberculosis, typhus,
and intestinal parasites plagued Indian communities. Perhaps 90
percent of Indian children were undernourished.'
The shameful specter of "prosperity beside mass poverty" in Chiapas
led one notable scholar of the region to conclude that "Itlhe distribution of
power and wealth within Chiapas has changed very little .. .since the
1890s."6 "'The government and the finqueros are the same thing,"' remarked
one agrarian leader, "Itlhey are together and they want to screw the Indian.."62
If poverty as handmaiden of high economic growth has become the
resolute rule in Chiapas, then Mexico and its NAFTA partners had better
56. BARRY, supra note 19, at 168-69.
57. Id.
58. During the 1980s, peasant groups formed in states as diverse as Oaxaca,
Pueblo, Veracruz, Tabasco, Hidalgo, Sinaloa, Baja California, Baja California Sur, and
Michoacan. See Interview with Zapatista Supporter, in Mexico City, Mexico (Jun. 5,
1996) (on file with author); see also BARRY, supra note 16, at 153-171.
59. See discussion infra part II.A.
60. THOMAS BENJAMIN, A RICH LAND, A POOR PEOPLE, 230 (1989).
61. ld. at 231.
62. Id.
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take heed; the export-led development scheme employed in Chiapas during
the last forty years is the precise model contemplated under NAFTA.6" Will
NAFTA thus normalize throughout Mexico what has now become true of
Chiapas-that it "remains as before: a rich land, and a poor people."?'
The rapid industrialization and urbanization that occurred throughout
Mexico after 1940, and which led to deep agrarian crisis, did not similarly alter
the rural-economic composition of Chiapas. It "remained predominantly rural
and agricultural."'" For example, while agriculture suffered a precipitous decline
in national importance between 1940 and 1977,6 in Chiapas "It he total value of
agricultural, livestock, and lumber production increased from 81 million pesos
in 1950 to 1.5 billion by 1970 and 3 billion by 1975.67 Land in cultivation
"increased from 270,000 hectares in 1950 to 750,000 in 1975.8
Chiapas' impressive economic growth concentrated almost exclusively
in agroexports and ranching. In fact, between 1940 and 1970, Chiapas
became Mexico's number one coffee producer, 9 with that commodity
comprising 40 percent of the state's total agricultural production by 1970.70
Sugar cane and cotton had also become "economically important."'" But the
greatest agricultural expansion was seen in cattle raising. Between 1950 and
1960, "ranchers increased their herds by 65 percent ... from 480,00 head to
790,000.72 "By 1970, the cattle stock had reached 1.25 million head (or more
than 2 million according to one estimate).'
Chiapas' disproportionate and rapid growth in production for the
national and international market led to a considerable over-concentration
and underdevelopment of the Chiapan ejida 74 sector. By 1960, latifundistas
63. See discussion infra part IV.B.1-2.
64. See BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 223.
65. id.
66. Even though, as previously mentioned, agricultural exports grew after
1940, see supra note 47 and accompanying text, by 1977, Mexican agriculture, which in
1940 had comprised 10 percent of the nation's total production, had fallen by half, to
just 5 percent. CAMIN & MEYER, supra note 45, at 162.
67. BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 224.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 223-24.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 223.
73. Id.
74. Ejidos and comunidades agrarian are the two main types of indigenous-
peasant landholdings in Mexico. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 120. Although both have
elements of communal ownership, comunidades agrarias, which number only about
1200 in all of Mexico, are distinguishable from ejidos in that they consist mostly of
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(large landowners with over 1,000 hectares) owned about 60 percent of all
land in Chiapas while comprising only 2.4 percent of all landowners.7" In
addition, "while some 900 ejidos supported 92,000 families, as compared to
30,000 land-owning families, the ejidal sector earned one-third as much,
owned one-tenth as many tractors, and possessed land valued at one-third
of the amount of private property."7 Much of this social distortion can be
attributed to the process of ganaderizacion in Chiapas "the expansion of
pastures for cattle at the expense of cropland.""
Under ganaderizacion, "Iclattlemen converted lands formerly rented or
sharecropped by corn farmers into pastures, rented or simply invaded ejido
lands."" The case of Venustiano Carranza is illustrative: Beginning in 1945,
residents there had petitioned the government for the return of lands being held
by cattlemen. In 1967, the Mexican President awarded provisional title to 50,000
hectares to the residents. The cattlemen, who were in possession of 20,000,
refused to leave. Later, in 1974, the Department of Agrarian Affairs and
Colonization ordered the cattlemen to cede the land. Still, nothing happened.
Finally, in 1976, the year after one of their ejido leaders was assassinated, the
ejidatarios moved back on to their lands, "built houses, and started farming."
However, the Mexican Army interceded by forcibly evicting the ejidataios, burning
their homes, and jailing their leaders. During the army offensive, several of the
ejidatarios, "including women and children, were killed or wounded."7'
Incidents of state-sponsored terrorism were not an isolated event
during the era. In 1975, 1976 and 1980, soldiers and/or police forced
indigenous peoples in Chiapas off their lands by killing them and burning
their homes."0 Amnesty International described these peasant removal
efforts as "a pattern of apparently deliberate political killings."8'
Mexico's leadership was not impervious to the agrarian crisis festering
in its resource-rich southernmost region and elsewhere in the country. But,
holdings of indigenous communities whose claim on the land usually dates back to
"pre-Columbian and colonial eras." Id.
75. See BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 226.
76. See id.
77. id. at 232. Another factor fueling rising land pressures, in addition to ganaderizacion,
was the construction of dams and hydroelectric power plants. The construction of only a few of
these could easily wipe out hundreds of thousands of cultivable acres. One example of this
was the construction of the Grijalva-Usumacinta hydroelectric facility and three dams in
Chiapas. Their construction, during the 1970s, required that over 200,000 hectares of cultivable
land in the Central Valley be submerged. See id. at 229-230.
78. ld at 232.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 235.
81. Id.
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by 1980 any diversion of state assistance was "a case of too little, too late." 2
Overpopulation, soil degradation, stagnant agrarian reform, corruption of
government, aid entities, increased land concentration, inflation and labor
exploitation had combined 3 to create "a system not only incapable of
reproducing the conditions for the survival of the rural population but one
fundamentally threatening to peasant agriculture and nutrition."'
In these circumstances, it became clear that the seeds for violent and
epic agrarian struggle had long been sown. In the center of that crisis strained
the tug-of-war between large private landowners, on the one hand, and
subsistence producers, on the other, for the country's most-prized natural
resource-land. In one study of 115 peasant uprisings in Chiapas during the
1970s, ranging from violent attacks to simple takeovers of municipal buildings
and land, the conclusions, though not surprising, are nonetheless telling: 87
of the uprisings "had been caused by the takeover of ejidal and communal
lands" by large agroexport entities, namely cattle ranchers.5
Ill. Zapata in Reverse;' Global Finance and the Straightlacketing of
the Mexican Revolution
[Slome two million campesino families - about three-quarters of
the nation's corn farmers-'will have to search for alternatives
in other crops, reorganize their landholdings, associate with
private capitalists, or become wage laborers.'
Mexican Government's 1992 Program
for Agricultural Development 7
Mexico's leadership, during the 1980s, did not respond to its nation's
widening agrarian crisis with social development schemes or mass land
redistribution efforts, as had some of its predecessors." It instead looked to Latin
America's version of the "invisible hand" theory, or neoliberalism, for national well-
being and prosperity.3 Given Mexico's traditional populist and nationalist slant, this
82. . Id. at 230.
83. See interview with Bishop Ruiz, supra note 20.
84. SANDERSON, supra note 47, at 8.
85. BENJAMIN, supra note 60, at 234.
86. See LA BOTZ, supra note 3, at 101.
87. BARRY, supra note 16, at 47 (emphasis added).
88. Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940), for example, on the heels of several
conservative regimes and rising rural tensions, nationalized oil companies and
railroads and energetically redistributed record amounts of land to peasants. See E.
BRADFORD BURNS, LATIN AMERICA: A CONCISE INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 196 (1990).
89. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 78.
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new economic course was truly revolutionary. Combining part philosophy with part
religion,90 "Itihe neoliberal prescription is always the same: swiftly privatize the
economy, liberate markets or govemment regulations and other obstacles, and
open up the national economy to international and foreign investment.""' The
"social amelioration role" of govemment is rejected outright. 2
The obvious question remained, however: Why would a nation, once so
committed to state intervention, suddenly "steer[I hard in the direction of
economic orthodoxy?"93 To answer that question we need to visit the Third
World Debt Crisis of 1982 and, in particular, consider the role of the world
financial community in crafting austere free-market debt rescheduling plans.94
A. Submission to the International Lending Community
" can assert that in a few, recent years, a group of Mexicans ...
headed, counseled and aided by the private banks, have withdrawn more
money from this country, than all of the empires that have exploited us from
90. "Even more than other social theorists, neo-liberals in their public discourse are
notably dogmatic and technocratic." JOSEPH COLLINS & JOHN LEAR, CHILE'S FREE-MARKET MIRACLE:
A SECOND LOOK 45 (1995). Neo-liberals "routinely put forward their economic program as the
'true,' 'modem' economic science, the only rational option, the only one backed by 'absolute
knowledge' of a 'scientific' character." Id. (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 40; see also Barry, supra note 19, at 77-78.
92. COLLINS & LEAR, supra note 90, at 40.
93. Manual Pastor & Carol Wise, The Origins and Sustainability of Mexico's Free Trade
Policy, 48 INT'L ORG. 459, 463 (1994).
94. The Third World Debt Crisis announced its arrival in 1982 when Mexico
discontinued servicing its debt. See Doug Henwood, Whatever Happened to Third World
Debt?, in 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND 39 39-43 (Kevin Danaher ed., 1995). Marcos Arruda, coordinator of
the Institute of Alternative Policies for the Southern Cone of Latin America describes
the origin of Third World Debt:
During the 1970s, there was an enormous flow of petrodollars seeking easy
investments throughout the world. The Northem countries sent ambassadors
offering very cheap loans to finance investments in Southern countries. The
1970s was the decade of the two oil crises of 1974 and 1979, and it was also the
decade of military regimes all over the world, many of them sponsored by the
CIA. During the 1970s, 18 of 24 Latin American nations were under military
dictatorships. So the bankers actually dealt with our dictators on the big loans
that created our countries' overwhelming indebtedness.
Marcos Aruda, interviewed by Multinational Monitor, Brazil: Drowning in Debt, in 50
YEARS IS ENOUGH supra, at 44.
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the beginnings of our history.95 With these words Mexican President Jose
Lopez Portillo (1976-82) nationalized all of his country's banks and declared
a moratorium on debt payments.96 After years of lavish spending and ill-
advised borrowing at high interest rates, the nation suddenly found itself
unable to make payments on its national debt." Nevertheless, its departing
leader, who himself had overseen much of the debt accumulation," struck a
defiant tone against unscrupulous Mexican capitalists and interest-happy
global lending institutions."
Several factors contributed to Mexico's debt crisis. Expansionary
government policies, currency over-evaluation, capital flight and "extremely
high" U.S. interest rates explain parts of the problem."° The greatest
contributing factor, however, was over-reliance on oil revenues. During the
1970s, as Mexico became a world leader in oil exports, its source of revenue
and share of imports rose dramatically.' Soon the value of imports far
exceeded the balance of revenue generated by oil exports. For example,
between 1976 and 1981, while "the value of oil exports grew ... from $560
million to $14,600 million," the total value of imports disproportionately
skyrocketed from $9,400 million to $32,000 million. 2 By the end of the 1970s
Mexico was facing disastrous yearly current account imbalances.
One man's desperation is another man's opportunity. As Mexico's immense
need for foreign monies became apparent, international lending institutions
envisaged a golden opportunity to funnel endless amounts of funds to the region
at high interest rates and, at the same time, make "very substantial profits.""' "U.S.
money banks" led the way.'0 4 By 1982, when three-quarters of Mexico's external
95. CAMIN & MEYER, supra note 45, at 216.
96. See id.
97. See BURNS, supra note 88, at 198-99.
98. See CAMIN & MEYER, supra note 45, at 216.
99. Mexico was not the first Third World country to sound the nationalist alarm
against the debt crisis. Three years earlier, in 1979, Julius Nyerere, former President of
Tanzania, declared before the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO),
that "under the present world economic order, the rich and the industrialized areas -
automatically, as well as by the exercise of naked power, extract from the poor and rural
areas even the little which they have." JULIUS K. NYERERE, MAN AND DEVELOPMENT 109 (1979).
100. See Rudiger Dornbusch & Alejandro Werner, Mexico: Stabilization, Reform, and
No Growth, I BROOKING'S PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 253, 256-257 (1994).
101. See BURNS, supra note 88, at 198.
102. CAMIN & MEYER, supra note 45, at 210.
103. Louis W. Pauly, Promoting a Global Economy: The Normative Role of the
International Monetary Fund, in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER, 204,
210 (Richard Stubbs et al. eds., 1994).
104. Id.
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debt was owed to commercial banks, "Itlhe largest chunk of commercial credit -
about one-third - came from U.S. banks."'05 Moreover, the thirteen largest U.S.
banks, led by Citibank and Chase Manhattan, saw profits from Latin America
increase from 16.7 percent in 1970 to 49 percent in 1976.'0
Loose international borrowing ultimately led to Mexico's undoing. By 1982,
the country had "accumulated an external debt amounting to 49 percent of its
gross domestic product."'' 7 "Interest payments alone represented more than 50
percent of export income."' ° But even then, while Mexico's long-term economic
health stood in the balance, Washington did not confer its highest concern; the
exposure of the U.S. dominated lending industry to Third World debt was more
worrisome. The nine largest U.S. banks had seen their debt exposure to the
seventeen most-highly indebted Third World countries rise to 194 percent of
capital reserves by 1982.'" A "definitive default on this debt could have provoked
bankruptcy at the heart of the industrial banking system.""'
Mindful of the impending collapse of the world financial system, and
with the "international balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism" firmly
in their hands, private and world lending institutions, in conjunction with
the Federal Reserve, the FDIC and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, quickly put together a stabilization strategy."' The hallmark, and
most controversial aspect, of this strategy was that debtor nations
"demonstrate their ability and willingness to repay their debts in full."'" 2 In
the context of international lending euphemisms, this translated to
submission to a prescribed free-market structural adjustment program:
privatization, trade liberalization, and the slashing of public sector
spending."3 Mexico, as the largest Third World debtor country and first to
default, stood first in line to receive "free-market economic communion.'" 4
105. BARRY, supra note 19, at 84.
106. See Pauly, supra note 103, at 204-2 10.
107. Dornbusch & Werner, supra note 100, at 256-57. Among the seventeen
highly indebted Third World countries in 1982, Mexico was one of a group of four
that accounted for 78 percent of total debt owed to commercial banks. Id.
108. BARRY, supra note 19, at 84.
109. See WILLIAM CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT RE-EXAMINED 6 (1995).
110. Id.
1I1. Matthew Shepherd, U.S. Domestic Interests and the Latin American Debt Crisis, in
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER, supra note 103, at 302,309.
112. Id. at 307.
113. See Walden Bello, Global Economic Counterrevolution: How Northern Economic
Warfare Devastates the South, in 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH supra note 94, at 16-19.
[A]s more and more Third World countries ran into greater difficulties
servicing the huge loans made to them by Northern banks in the 1970s, the
banks made the adoption of the World Bank structural adjustment program
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B. Straightlacketing the Mexican Revolution
The southern version of "trickle-down economics," imposed upon the Mexican
people because of their lender's irresponsible borrowing and global financiers'
unscrupulous lending, gave the Mexican Republic little choice in how it could
respond to its severe agrarian crisis, now in its second decade. Instead of rendering
state assistance to the small campesino and indigenous farmer, as past regimes had
done,'" the new technocratic"6 power structure abandoned completely the idea of the
populist-agrarian state and instead led a massive economic restructuring based on
free-market principles: they opened up the country's domestic markets to foreign
competition by joining GAIT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Tradel;"7
dramatically reduced the number of state enterprises from 1,155 in 1982 to 217 in
1992;' eliminated state subsidization, assistance, and price guarantee programs for
the agricultural sector;' 9 and, finally, imposed fiscal austerity measures in the areas
of wage and price controls.'
21
By far the most far-reaching of these changes, however, occurred in the
area of land reform. After 75 years of mandatory land redistribution, as set
forth in Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, Mexico's latest elite decided
that a continued constitutional commitment to the indigenous-peasantry
was no longer necessary.
When Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was amended in 1992, it
"created a completely new legal framework for land tenure and property
rights.,' 2' Up until then the Constitution had guaranteed land redistribution
essential to debt rescheduling. They argued that the structural reforms
ensured debtors' alibilities to continue paying their debts beyond the short
term. Unable to gain access to further private bank financing without the
World Bank seal of approval, governments surrendered. By the end of 1985,
12 of the 15 debtors designated as top-priority debtors . .. [Mexico
includedl had submitted to structural adjustment programs.
Bello, supra at 17.
114. See LA BOTZ supra note 3, at 105; see also Mexico: September 1996, National
Westminster Bank Country Briefs, Sept. 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Quest
Economic Database.
115. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
116. 'Technocrat" refers to those in government who believe in the "science of
economics," neoliberalism, as the sole "basis of decision making." LA BOrZ, supra note 3 at 103.
117. See Pastor & Wise, supra note 93, at 463.
118. See Dornbusch & Werner, supra note 100, at 261.
119. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 105.
120. See BARRY, supra note 19, at 91.
121. lose Cordoba, Mexico, in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL
ORDER, supra note 103, at 232, 254.
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to peasant groups.'22 In addition, it contained a whole battery of restrictions
and stipulations severely limiting land use: government land endowments
were limited to ejido or communal farms; new ejidatarios could not sell, rent
or mortgage their endowed lands; the land could not be used as loan
collateral; all labor on the lands had to be done by the ejidatarios themselves
or family members; inheritance and inter-ejido contracting were subject to
multifarious regulations; and finally, corporations could not own or manage
ejido lands for agricultural, livestock or forestry activities.'23
The breadth of these rights and restrictions was immense. By 1990,
land expropriation and redistribution had affected one-half of the country's
total rural area and encompassed approximately three million people
organized into over 28,000 ejidos.'24
By amending Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, however, Salinas
demonstrated to his people and the world why Mexico has been coined the
"perfect dictatorship." In November 1991, Salinas announced his proposed
changes to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.' 2' Within two months his
text was approved by both houses of Congress and ratified by all 31 states in
the Republic.2 6 Enabling legislation, La Ley Agraria, was passed soon after.'27
The changes to Article 27 granted ejidatarios the right to sell, buy, and
rent their land; to hire labor, and to contract with other producers, including
foreign entities.2 8 In addition, domestic and foreign corporations were given
the authority to acquire ejido lands for agricultural, livestock and forestry
activities.'2 And in order to make the newly privatized lands transactable,
the new law included an ambitious land titling and registration program.
Land titling covered all 29,000 ejidos, spanning an area 102 million hectares
or "more than one-half the national territory."'3 °
Complementing land reform was the government's termination of
agricultural price supports and subsidies. Under the new agricultural regime,
crop prices would fall to international levels and payments were to be made
122. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 117.
123. See CORDOBA, supra note 12 1, at 255.
124. See EIIDo REFORM RESEARCH PROJECT, CENTER FOR U.S.-MEXICAN STUDIES,




128. See Cordoba, supra note 12-1, at 256-257.
129. See id.; see also Luis Felipe Valladolid Chavez, Privatization of Mexican Ejidos:
The Implications of the New Article 27, U.C. BERKELEY McNAIR JOURNAL, (visited Sept. 24,
1998) http://www-mcnair.berkeley.edu:80/95Journal/LuisChavez.html.
130. Id.
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directly to producers of basic grains on a per-hectare basis.'3 ' This new
emphasis obviously called for a "shift of resources from traditional crops
into those in which Mexico has greater comparative advantage.""2
The gist of Salinas' agricultural reform was clear. The government
wanted to end Mexico's status as a bi-modal economy (agrarian-industrial)
by privatizing indigenous lands, conferring land titles and registration, and
terminating price guarantees. The country's "backward" and "inefficient"
agricultural sector (the indigenous-peasantry), it was hoped, would
modernize "so as to compete effectively in the capitalist world system."'33
The groundwork for NAFTA, the vehicle by which Mexico's leaders hoped to
carry them into the global economy, and the instrument that the Zapatistas
perceived as their final death-knell, had been obediently laid.
IV. NAFTA and the Decline of Mexico's Corn Producers
NAFTA is fundamentally changing the face of Mexican agriculture. Because
it forced the Mexican govemment to substantially reduce supports for
Mexican grain farmers, they are shifting away from com production.' 4
On the eve of NAFTA's adoption, its U.S. proponents waxed poetic
about the economic good the Treaty wouldbring to Mexico. "Illncreased
trade, investment, and cooperation between the United States and Mexico,
stimulated by the NAFTA should result in significant environmental gains,"
gushed USA*NAFrA, Inc., a consortium representing "1100 large and small
companies" and "CEO's of 60 large U.S. multinational corporations."'35 The
U.S. Department of State opined that expected increased trade and
investment flows among NAFTA partners "Iwould] lead to job creation and
allow for more balanced development throughout Mexico."'36 It stated that
"the whole idea of INAFTA] is to raise standards of living ... and incomes. '
Mexican free-trade adherents were no less hortatory.in their free-trade
incantations. But to them, NAFTA promised much more than mere
economic salvation. It meant the difference between a country labeled as
emerging and one garnering full membership in the western community of
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. EIIDo REFORM RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 124, at 2.
134. Corn Commodity Description, U.S. Feed Grains Council, supra note 36.
135. Environmental Aspects of the North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1993).
136. Chiapas: Implications for U.S.-Mexico Relations, U.S. Dept. of State, Feb. 14,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Dept. of State Dispatch.
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nations. As the Salinas Administration averred: "A North American free trade
agreement will ... pull Mexico out of the stagnation of the third world and
place it firmly in the realm of the first world."'34
If, however, by shrouding NAFTA in a syrup of economic and
nationalistic euphemisms, U.S. and Mexican free-trade proselytizers wished
to avert a Mexican backlash, they grossly miscalculated. "ENOUGH IS
ENOUGH," the Zapatista Army declared on January 1, 1994, NAFTA's
inaugural date.'39 For too long-
Iwle have been denied the most elemental preparation so they
can use us as cannon fodder and pillage the wealth of our
country. They don't care that we have nothing, absolutely
nothing, not even a roof over our heads, no land, no work, no
health care, no food nor education.'
40
The launch date of the Zapatista Uprising is not coincidental. NAFTA was
viewed by them as the final insult after "500 years of struggle.1' 4' Lamented one
campesino, Margarito Sanchez, from Tuxtepec, Veracruz: "For us campesinos, the
problem is that we are just beginning to understand all the implications of free
trade and having to compete against U.S. farmers. We don't know why it has to be
this way, but it probably means the end to our communities.--
42
Mexico's indigenous-peasantry worry, in particular, about food security.
Since they are first and foremost subsistence corn growers, they worry that free
trade might fatally undermine their ability to continue producing that crop. As one
writer observes: "Under NAFTA there is legitimate fear that cheap food imports
from the United States will wipe out whatever small margin currently exists for the
small producers. Bad news for the 90 percent of Chiapas communities already
classified as economically 'marginal."4 3
A. Corn and the Indigenous-Peasantry
If the community loses corn, it means that the indian campesino
loses dignity. Corn is our food, and the life of our culture.44
138. . BARRY, supra note 19, at 113.
139. Declaration of War, supra note 40.
140. Id.
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142. BARRY, supra note 16, at 65.
143. COOPER, supra note 41, at 7.
144. BARRY, supra note 16, at 93.
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Maize, or corn, more than any other staple food item produced in Mexico, is
a "crop of the poor."'4 Together with beans, maize provides 84 percent of the
dietary protein consumed by the poor in Mexico.'46 By contrast, for those at the
top income category, maize and beans provide less than 13 percent of the dietary
protein consumed.' 7 In the rural sector, where poverty rates are highest,' the
dietary importance of maize is most striking-"a typical rural resident will
consume three-fourths of his daily calories and 80 percent of his protein in the
form of [com tortillas and beans . .. "
The vast amounts of cultivable land surface devoted to maize
production reflects the large numbers of poor in Mexico. "Maize is grown
throughout Mexico, a crop spanning the full range of Mexican productive
ecologies, from the highlands of Tlaxcala and Puebla to the irrigation
districts of Sonora, Aguascalientes, Jalisco, and Michoac6n, to the tropical
extremes of the Yucat6n Peninsula.""' It is grown by an estimated 68 percent
of those employed in agriculture."' And, as of 1990, it was planted on
approximately 40 percent of the country's arable land surface."2
In some regions, maize production reaches the extremes. In 1978, for
example, maize cultivation "consumeld] over 90 percent of the agricultural
area of the state of Mexico and over 85 percent of all land cultivated in
Chiapas, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, and Yucatin.""'3 Nonetheless, as testimony
to its "broad geographical base," only Jalisco produced more than 10 percent
of the total national production.'
54
A substantial bulk of Mexico's corn is grown by the country's indigenous-
peasantry. Categorized as limited-surplus producers, and numbering
approximately 2.2 million,' they produce crops on subsistence and infra-
subsistence farms of 5 hectares or less."16 And though their farmlands are usually
of marginal quality,"' indigenous-peasantry have been able to produce enough
corn to feed not only themselves, but a considerable portion of their countrymen
145. SANDERSON, supra note 47, at 215.
146. See id. at 221 (according to 1968 and 1975 household expenditure surveys).
147. See id.
148. See Correa, supra note 23, at 32.
149. SANDERSON, supra note 47, at 221,
150. Id. at 215.
151. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 103.
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TRADE POucY, (last modified July 2, 1996) httpJAvww.igc.apc.org/iatp/mexcom.html.
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as well. In recent years, limited-surplus producers contributed 3.5 million metric
.tons of corn to their nation, an amount corresponding to one-fourth of the total
national corn production.' 8 They also produce approximately 40 percent of
Mexico's commercial corn.' 9 It is estimated that 78 percent of the country's
communal farmers, i.e., those living on ejidos and comunidades agrarias, are
engaged in corn production."6
It is important to note, however, that while "Iclorn is central" to Mexico's
small rural economy, "it is the rare campesino who depends solely on what he
or she harvests..' 6' Corn production, even prior to the neoliberal privatizations of
the 1980s, rarely met the subsistence needs of the small peasant farmer.'62
Consequently, "lain estimated 85 percent of corn growers depend on other
economic activities on or off the farm to ensure family survival."'6
Nonetheless, the importance of com production to Mexico's small corn
growers cannot be gain-said. In addition to comprising the vital core of their
nutritional profile, corn contributes significantly to the peasantry's economic
survival: small growers of 5 hectares or less market nearly "one-half of the total corn
they produce.""M Additionally, there is the fear of contaminating ancient native
breeds of Mexican com with biogenetically engineered U.S. equivalents:
Should Mexico become entirely dependent on com imports from the
Midwestem states in the U.S., just imagine what would happen in the
case of [U.S.] floods like the one in the Summer of 1993? In Mexico, we
have 20 breeds of com, which have evolved over a period of one
thousand years. Those farmers that are technologically more advanced
in Chihuahua, are now facing viruses and plagues in their farms, due
to the fact that they imported contaminated seeds from the U.S.'65
B. Corn Under Siege: NAFTA's Agricultural Provisions
The only thing that is not negotiable [in the free trade
agreementl is the virginity of the Virgin of Guadalupe. That
stays. Everything else is on the table.
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- Senior Ministry of Finance official, 1990'6
NAFTA's agricultural provisions best reflect the anxiety felt by Mexico's
small corn producers. Those provisions remove all protective measures
afforded the peasantry and pit them in direct competition with multinational
U.S. grain concerns. Luis Hernandez Navarro, a peasant leader, captured the
obvious asymmetry of this new relationship in 1993:
The losers junder the NAFTAI :.. above all larel the small corn producers..
. The national average yield is 1.7 tons per hectare, compared to 7.5 tons
per hectare in the United States .... Corn is the heart of campesino
production. Liberalization of corn markets associated with NAFTA and the
elimination of government-guaranteed prices (almost double the price on
the international market) will mean an end to food self-sufficiency in
Mexico, or what's left of it .... 67
Some indigenous-peasantry are more blunt. They speak of the "great
population surgery" or the demographic cleansing of the small peasant farmer
from the Mexican countryside.'" They believe that free trade will lead to:
the ruin of hundreds of thousands of producers; and the more
or less massive emigration of many of these to the United
States as illegal workers-all this, even taking into account the
fifteen year transition period established by the agreement.
Several researchers have calculated that nearly 850 thousand
households will leave the countryside, 600 thousand of which
will go to the United States in search of employment."
The predictions made by Mexico's indigenous-peasantry are dire. They
essentially claim that the entire Mexican countryside will be transformed
under NAFTA as their numbers are forced from the land. In the bosom of
free-trade, there simply is no room for subsistence agriculturalists.
Because of the millions of families implicated and the relatively short
tenure of NAFTA, it would be difficult, if not. impossible, to confirm or deny
this allegation. However, by focusing solely on the last three years, it is
possible to ascertain whether NAFTA trade data either supports or negates the
Zapatista's likening of NAFTA to a "death certificate."
The cardinal threat that NAFTA's agricultural provisions pose to
Mexico's indigenous-peasantry is the potential for rapid and sustained
166. BARRY, supra note 19, at 75 (quoting David Goldman, A Revolution You Can
Invest In, FORBES, July 9, 1990).
167. Mexican Agricullural Policies, supra, note 32, at 69.
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surges in basic grain imports from the U.S.'70 If that were to occur, and the
indigenous-peasantry were unable to respond in kind with more cheaply
produced corn, their ability to hold on to their farms, to feed their families,
and to remain in the countryside would disappear. 7' How and why this
would occur, and the particular crops most susceptible to sudden
import/export surges, requires a summary review of relevant NAFTA
agricultural provisions and a basic understanding of the theory of relative
comparative trade advantage that undergirds free trade.
I. NAFTA's Agricultural Provisions
Under NAFTA Mexico maintains separate bilateral agricultural
agreements with the U.S. and Canada'72 covering virtually every sector of
Mexican agriculture. Under the U.S.-Mexico accord domestic protection is
removed for all classes of agriculture, livestock, poultry and dairy products.'73
The Canada-Mexico accord is less ambitious. Dairy, poultry, egg and sugar
sectors remain tariff protected. Despite the different tariff reduction
schemes, however, all three nations are expected to eventually move toward
domestic support policies that are non-trade distorting.'7"
The centerpiece of the agricultural agreement, the portion that may
pose the greatest threat to Mexico's small corn producers, is the market
access provisions that open up Mexico's protected sectors to international
free trade. Principally contained in article 703 of NAFTA, they provide for the
immediate elimination, or progressive elimination in a 5, 10, or 15-year
period, of all tariff and quantitative restrictions on every agricultural good
traded between member countries.'7 5 This includes grains and oilseeds,
fruits and juices, vegetables, sugar, sugar-containing products, dairy
products, cotton, peanuts, livestock and meat, poultry, fish, cut flowers,
lumber and wood products, and alcoholic beverages.' Under this schedule,
by 2009, there should be no remaining agricultural tariffs between the U.S.
and Mexico. All non-tariff barriers, such as import licensing restrictions, are
170. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 100, 157, 253.
171. Seeid. at233.
172. See Mexico: Agricultural Mach./Equipment/Related Services, National Trade Data
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173. See Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of the North
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eliminated through conversion to a tariff rate quota system (TRO)." Under
the TRO system, a particular item is assigned a specific quota on imports,
with imports below this quota tariff free.'78
Certain domestically sensitive crops are given a mandatory long-term
phase out schedule. In Mexico's case corn, dry beans, milk powder and
sugar are assigned the maximum 15-year-phase-out period.'79 For the U.S.,
the 15-year phase out period covers frozen concentrated orange juice,
sugar and peanuts.'"
2. Relative Comparative Trade Advantage
The success of NAFTA's agricultural provisions hinges on the theory of
relative comparative trade advantage. According to this theory, if each
nation were to produce solely those products to which their natural
resources best conduce, then global production becomes maximized,
followed by "improved quality and lower prices for consumers..'8 ' Malthus, in
his "The Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of Restricting the Importation
of Foreign Corn," summarized the process over a century ago:
Illf every nation were to devote itself particularly to those kinds
of industry and produce, to which its soil, climate, situation,
capital, and skill, were best suited; and were then freely to
exchange these products with each other, it would be the most
certain and efficacious mode, not only of advancing the wealth
and prosperity of the whole body of the commercial republic
with the quickest pace, but of giving to each individual nation of
the body the full and perfect use of all its resources.'82
177. See International Agriculture and Trade--NAFTA (pt. 1), Economic Research Service, M2
Presswire, Sep. 26, 1996 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsletter Database.
178. See Mexico: Agricultural Mach./EquipmentRelated Services, supra note 172. The
initial quota amounts are based generally on the highest annual trade level in the
1988-91 trade period and are tracked to grow at 3 percent annually. See id.
179. See Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy and Selected Industries of the North
American Free-Trade Agreement, supra note 173.
180. See id.
181. Clearing Mexico's Hurdles: U.S. Exporter's Checklist, American Chamber of
Commerce, Business Mexico, July 1995;, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
182. Rev. R.R. Malthus, The Grounds of an Opinion as an Appendix to "Observations on
the Corn Law," 1815, available in Internet, http://fisher.ecn.bris.ac.uk/het/malthus/
grounds.txt. Malthus was not endorsing comparative trade theory. He was in fact
warning Britain against the food insecurity that could obtain from relying on other
nations for corn. See id.
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Under NAFTA, relative comparative trade advantage is taken to its
logical extreme. Since all protective tariffs and other protective measures are
phased out in 15 years, NAFTA trade members should only produce those
products that can turn a profit on the international market, i.e., those
products in which they enjoy a relative comparative trade advantage.'83
One way of predicting which food items Mexico and the U.S. maintain
comparative trade advantages in is through the United Nations Food and
Agricultural Organization's Relative Trade Advantage Factor (RA).'4 An RA
measurement greater than zero indicates a relative comparative advantage
for a specific commodity in a global market, while a value below zero
indicates a relative disadvantage.'' 85 For coarse grains, such as corn, wheat,
and oil seeds, the U.S. has the highest positive rating, a 7.5.'" But for fruits
and vegetables the U.S. records an RA of zero."7 Mexico is a near mirror
opposite. It has an RA of -7 and -6 in basic grains and oilseeds, respectively,
but a positive 3 RA for fruits and vegetables.' 8
Accordingly, under comparative trade theory, Mexico ought to become
the major, if not sole, supplier of fruits and vegetables to the U.S., while the
U.S. becomes the major, if not sole, supplier of basic grains to Mexico. This
form of global food sourcing was evident by the 1980s. By then, Mexico had
already become the largest single supplier of horticultural products to the
U.S., "no match supplying more than 50 percent of the winter vegetables
imported into the United States."'89 In the last three years, it appears that
this process has accelerated considerably.
C. Agricultural Trade Trends Under NAFTA
Recently, Florida vegetable producers began dramatically dumping their
produce in a symbolic gesture to signal their displeasure over a rapid rise in
Mexican vegetable imports." ° Senator Bob Graham of Florida complained that
183. See International Agriculture and Trade-NAFTA (pt. 1), supra note 177.





189. BARRY, supra note 19, at 165. There were other Mexican agroexport
products reflected Mexico's comparative trade advantage with the U.S. By 1990,
"coffee exports to the United States constituteldl more than a third of the country's
agricultural exports" and its feeder cattle market became the largest U.S. supplier. Id.
190. See U.S. Proposing Tariffs, Weekly Quotas on Mexican Fruit, CNN, Jan. 19, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcript No. 791-5.
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"the domestic farmer is about to be wiped out because he can't compete
overnight with this surge of Ivegetablel imports coming out of Mexico."'9
Senator Graham was correct. Under NAFTA, Mexico had dramatically
increased its already dominant share of the U.S. winter vegetable market. In
fact, by March 1996, it had increased its share of the U.S. winter fresh
vegetable market to 62 percent.' 2
While Mexican horticultural products flooded the U.S., U.S. grain
likewise deluged the Mexican market. Marked by progressive record
increases for each year of NAFTA, corn led the way. In NAFTA's first year,
1994, for instance, U.S. corn exports to Mexico rose tenfold to 3 million
metric tons.'9 3 As of October 31, 1995, Mexico's corn imports surpassed by
71.9 percent the record levels achieved in 1994.' 9' Still, the most stunning
gains came in 1996. By September of that year, the U.S. had exported some
6.3 million metric tons of corn to Mexico.' 5
The surge of U.S. corn exports to Mexico in NAFTA's first three years
would, at first glance, appear counterintuitive. In late 1994, Mexico suffered
from a 50 percent peso devaluation. 96 This not only made the import of
foreign goods prohibitive,'97 but, by making Mexican products relatively
cheap, it actually spurred Mexican exports.' 9 In addition, in 1995/96 the
world experienced a global grain shortage,9 9 "with the prospective stocks-to-
191, Id.
192. See World Agricultural Outlook Board: Vegetables and Specialties Part 1, M2
Presswire, Apr. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsletter Database.
193. See Mexico Tightens Rules on Booming U.S. Grain Imports, Reuter, Mar. 24, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Central and South America File.
1'94. See Mexico Imports UP 71.9 Percent to October 31,Reuter, Dec. 1, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Central and South America File.
195. See USDA, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, ECONOMIC RESEARCH
SERVICE, Oct.-Nov.-Dec. 1996, at A-29.
196. See LA BOTZ, supra note 3, at 230.
197. See International Agriculture and Trade - NAFTA (pt. 1), supra note 177.
198. Evidence suggests, in fact, that the peso devaluation helped spur Mexican
exports to the U.S. Between Jan.-Feb. 1994 and Jan.-Feb. 1995, a $200 million Mexican
agricultural trade deficit turned into a $579 million Mexican trade surplus. See Trade
Secretariat Authorizes Duty-Free Import of 1.67 Million Tons of U.S. Corn Under NAFTA Terms, Latin
America Institute, Jun. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Latin America Database.
199. See Food Plentiful But Shortage of Cash, Inter Press Service, Apr. 10, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
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use ratio . . . matching the low reached in the 1930's Depression.' Corn
prices consequently skyrocketed to record levels.2"'
In the face of a dramatic peso devaluation and record global grain
price increases, how can the surge of U.S. corn exports to Mexico be
explained? One reason posited by trade analysts is that Mexico suffered
from drought during the last three years, and that this fueled the need to
import historic amounts of U.S. corn."' This scenario, by itself, however, is
inadequate. Not only is corn known for its resistance to inclement weather,0
but in Mexico corn has traditionally been planted on close to 50 percent of
its arable land surface by an estimated 68 percent of those engaged in
agriculture. 4 Additionally, the drought has afflicted only certain corn-
producing states of Mexico, mostly in the North.20' And what little drought
assistance the Mexican Government offered to afflicted states was not
directed to corn producers, but instead was slated for modernizing the
irrigation systems "for livestock producers"-agroexporters. °
If the drought does not provide a complete explanation for the record flow
of U.S. corn exports to Mexico in the last three years, NAFTA's agricultural
provisions, in conjunction with past neoliberal reforms, provide additional
insight. Recall that during the 1980s to early 1990s, Mexico slashed its rural
assistance to small farmers--cutting subsidies, technical assistance, and credit
programs."7 This led to a marked decrease in cultivation of traditional peasant
staple crops. Between 1991 and 1993, for instance, land devoted to basic grains
production dropped from 12,427,000 hectares to 9,406,000.218
The movement away from peasant-produced crops resulted in a
marked national diminution in the production of basic grains, including
corn, and, therefore, set the stage for increased dependency on U.S. grain
200. Feed Outlook Part 2, M2 Presswire, May 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Newsletter Database.
201. See Suppan, supra note 152.
202. See International Agriculture and Trade, supra note 177.
203. There are narrow windows in the corn growing cycle when weather
extremes can significantly retard harvest yields. See Corn Commodity Description, supra
note 36. However, corn is particularly known for its ability to grow in desert-like
conditions, such as in the American Southwest, where Indian civilizations have for
millennia depended upon it. See id.
204. See discussion supra part IV.A.
205. See International Agriculture and Trade, supra note 177.
206. Id.
207. See discussion supra part III.B.
208. See NAFTA & Inter-American Trade Monitor, Coalitions of Agricultural Groups
Demand Action, 2 INST. FOR AGRICULTURE AND TRADE POLICY (1995), available in Internet,
http://www.envirolink.org/seel/IATP/nafta/vol2no 11 .htr.
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008
products. The results have been devastating for Mexico's peasantry. The
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy writes that "liln Chiapas,
approximately 200,000 farm workers have lost their jobs because of the 50
percent drop in agricultural production," adding that "most of the reduction
is in maize and bananas, which account for 60 percent of agricultural
employment in Chiapas."'"
NAFTA complements and accelerates the process of food insecurity. It
achieves this chiefly by permitting U.S. corn producers to ship millions of
tons of corn to Mexico completely free of tariffs."20 This may seem striking
considering that Mexican corn is categorized as a sensitive national crop,
slapped with the maximum 15-year tariff phase out schedule."' Under the
tariff-free corn provisions, however, "many sensitive products," corn
included, are assigned a tariff rate quota (TRQ). 2 '2 "TROs allow a specific
quantity to enter at a reduced tariff, usually zero."'2'3 While imports above the
quota "face a higher tariff, these over-quota tariffs will be reduced to zero
during the implementation period, thus eliminating the need for TRO.
24
To date, Mexico has been very liberal with NAFTA's tariff-free quota
provisions, permitting tariff-free importation of virtually all U.S. corn.2 5 As of
October 1995, for instance, Mexico had raised its tariff-free corn import
quota to 3 million tons, an 18 percent increase over the 2.5 million tons
originally contemplated under NAFTA.26 Of this total nearly all, or 2.5 million
tons, were slated for direct consumers in Mexico."7 By June 1996;, "Mexico's
duty-free quota for U.S. corn imports" was set at 4.5 million metric tons."'
Hence, while NAFTA's 15-year phase out period"9 ostensibly protects
Mexico's "sensitized" crops from sudden import surges from the U.S., the
Treaty, by its TRO terms, renders the phase out period meaningless. Not
only is the U.S. given the economic incentive to flood the Mexican market
with corn, but the U.S. is so doing in record fashion. In these circumstances,
209. Id.
210. See NAFTA - two years of achievement, Fertilizer International, Sep. 19, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
211. See discussion supra part IV.B.2.
212. International Agriculture and Trade - NAFTA (pt. 1), supra note 177.
213. NAFTA: Two Years of Achievement, supra note 210.
214. Id.
215. See Mexico Ups Tariff-Free Corn Imports Quotas, Reuter, Oct. 6, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Central and South America file.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. Impact of NAFTA, U.S. Feed Grains Council, Jun. 3, 1996, (visited Sept. 24,
1998) http://www.grains.org/policy/nafta.htm.
219. See discussions supra part IV.B.2.
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where nearly 18 million indigenous-peasant families depend upon corn
production for consumption and marketing,22 and where the 15-year phase
out period is but a fiction, the Zapatista's likening of NAFTA to a "death
certificate" for the country's Indians,22 ' rings more true than hollow.
V. Implications
Today, Mexico's indigenous-peasantry stand at an historic crossroads.
After having endured two major agricultural upheavals since the 1910
Revolution-the gradual externalization of Mexican agriculture after 1940
and the abandonment of populist-agrarianism during the 1980s 222-they now
struggle in a new, more globalized context. Under NAFTA, the centerpiece of
this era's formal global free-market integration, Mexico's small corn
producers are thrust headfirst into the unannounced twists and turns of the
international market. Whether their communal subsistence communities
will wither or survive in the long term, depends on their ability to
transmogrify themselves into savvy export-oriented free-marketeers.
Unfortunately, information gleaned from the first three years under
NAFTA countenances otherwise. The ongoing neoliberal "policies
undermining Mexican family farmers" meant that Mexico continued its
national slide in basic grains production.22 "According to the Mexican
government, basic-grain production ... Ifell for the ten principal basic-grain
crops" by 13.3 percent during the first year of NAFTA.224 Production of corn,
between 1994 and 1995, fell by 2.5 million tons.22" ' Victor Suarez, director of
the National Association of Commercializing Enterprises of Rural Producers
(ANEC), remarks that in these circumstances, with Mexican agriculture
"decapitalized, stagnant, without integration in its different phases, with
government institutions dismantled, and with drastic reductions in
subsidies," his country's food dependency will worsen.226
Already under NAFTA, the U.S. is shipping record levels of tariff-free
corn to Mexico. As mentioned earlier, in 1994, the first year of NAFTA, the
U.S. shipped ten times more corn than in 1993 or 3 million metric tons; 27 in
220. See discussion supra part IV.A.
221. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 157.
222. See discussion supra part 11.
223. Suppan, supra note 152.
224. Inst. For Policy Studies, et al., No Laughter in NAFTA: Mexico and the United
States Two Years After (1996) http://www.igc.org/dgap/.
225. See Suppan, Mexican Corn, NAFTA, and Hunger, supra note 152.
226. Eduardo Molina y Vedia, Mexico Trade: NAFTA Blamed for Farmers' Problems,
Inter Press Service, Jan. 7, 1997.
227. See supra notes 193-195 and accompanying text.
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1996, that figure topped 6 million metric tons.22"' Meanwhile, Mexican exports
to the U.S. of non-basic food items increased to record levels.229
It is thus apparent that after three years under NAFTA, Mexico has
quickened the pace toward food dependency and peasant marginalization:
the U.S. is providing more and more of Mexico's basic grains, namely corn,
and Mexico is in turn producing more and more of the fruit and vegetable
products consumed by U.S. families. While this may represent a more
efficient allocation of productive resources and lower regional food prices, it
may very well lead to what peasants have feared all along-their "ethnic
cleansing" from the Mexican countryside.23 ° This ethnic transformation will
likely result in both short and long-term consequences.
A. Short-Term Consequences
Reports of rural violence have grown commonplace in Mexico since
NAFTA took effect. As the trend of rising U.S. basic food imports, coupled
with the intensification of Mexican agroexport production, continues in
Mexico, the historic tension between subsistence producers, on the one
hand, and the large landowner and government, on the other, worsens.
In June 1995, seventeen peasants in the state of Guerrero were
assassinated in a hail of gunfire."' Numerous state police officials were
implicated by federal authorities in the massacre, including the state
governor.232 A new rebel group, the People's Revolutionary Army (EPR), incensed
at the impunity afforded the perpetrators, formed in the wake of the massacre.
Seemingly better financed, and certainly more violent than the Zapatistas, they
have already engaged in several deadly combats with the Mexican Military. 3 .
The Zapatistas, for their part, endure imminent threats of attack from
Mexican army units ringing their stronghold. In December 1994, as
Zapatistas and their supporters peacefully finished construction on several
small village encampments23 4 in preparation for their Special Forum on
228. See id.
229. See supra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 168-169 and accompanying text.
231. See 10 More Arrests in Mexican Massacre, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 12, 1995, at A-12.
232. See Anthony DePalma, Report on Mexico Massacre Provokes Political Storm, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at A3.
233. See Falso, que el EPR haya estado en Acapulco, precisa Gobernacion, LA JORNANDA,
Jul. 3, 1996, at 1.
234. Sometime during the summer of 1995, thousands of Maya Indians, at the
behest of the Zapatista High Command, began construction of four symbolic village
encampments, each given the name "Aguascalientes." Interview with Zapatista Supporter,
San Cristobal de Las Casas, Chiapas (Dec. 1995). They each took their name from the
town in central Mexico where Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa, in 1914, convened a
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Indigenous Rights, government forces inexplicably went on heightened alert
in and around the village areas.23 Sporadic reports soon came in that large
numbers of Mexican army troops were on their way toward the tiny villages,
accompanied by tanks and antipersonnel carriers.236 On December 26, 1996,
the EZLN announced publicly their fear of an impending "military action." '237
When reporters inquired of the Commander of the 7th Military Region
as to the sudden increase in military presence, his only response was that
the military was committed to "maintaining" the peace. 2" The Mexican
Secretary of State's response to questions about the new troop deployments
was even less satisfying. He indicated that the military was only conducting
"road patrols." The Governor of Chiapas went so far as to say that "the
situation in Chiapas is normal.2 9
Reports from independent observers and Indians near the new
Aguascalientes belied the government's assertion that things were "normal" and
that the troop movements were only routine road patrols. 2 1 Around one
Aguascalientes village, Oventic, about ninety minutes outside of San Cristobal
de Las Casas, a whole battalion of Mexican soldiers reportedly stood several
hundred feet from the village and assumed attack formation.2 "' They were armed
conventi6n in which delegates "pledged to support Zapata's Plan of Ayala, calling for the
distribution of land to the peasant communities." LA BOTZ, supra note 3, at 175-76. One
writer captured the momentous significance of the "new" Aguascalientes movement: "For
the first time in Mexico's history, the Indians had summoned the people of Mexico to
discuss the fate of the nation on the Indians' terms and on native soil." Id. at 176.
235. See lulio Cesar Lopez, Se Levantan Ya la Neuvos "Aquascalients" del ESLN, EL
PROCESSO, Dec. 25, 1995, at 33-34.
236. See Videotape: Mexican Military Staging Area, San Cristobal de Las Casas,
(Dec. 1995) (on file with author).
237. LAJORNADA, Dec. 27, 1995, at 2.
238. See id.
239. Id.
240. The author arrived in San Cristobal de las Casas just as the Mexican Army went on
heightened alert. Various local newspaper reports and local citizens spoke of the recent
military show of force. The author then went to investigate the scene of an alleged military
confrontation at Aguascalientes, located in Oventic. On his way there, he encountered
numerous soldiers stationed at strategic locations alongside roads and hiding in the forest. In
addition, not far from where the Oventic Aguascalientes village was, there were what looked
like modified U.S. "HUMVEE" vehicles, but mounted with rather large machine guns. As the
author approached the village entrance, Zapatista security personnel informed him that
indeed there had been a dose confrontation and that as a result the Indian village would have
to be closed off to outsiders until the Mexican Army stood down. See Field Study by author in
Chiapas, Mexico, (Dec. 1995-lan. 1996) (information on file with author).
241. Seeid.
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with assault rifles and other heavy military machinery.242 On the other side of
their guns stood whole families of Indians - men, women and children.243
Violence is likely to get worse. There are reports of the Mexican Army
acquiring military vehicles that are specially designed for riot control and
suppression of guerrilla warfare. Much of this equipment has been supplied
by the U.S. in the wake of the Zapatista Uprising. For instance, just after the
rebellion in 1994, the U.S. sent twenty-six military vehicles "equipped with
water cannonis]" to Mexico.2 4 In addition, the U.S. has already supplied
Mexico with 3,297 "Hummers," (armored infantry vehicles) which have been
equipped for use with light machine guns and grenade launchers.245
B. Long-Term Consequences
Given the increasing use of military and police force against Mexico's
indigenous-peasantry, it seems likely that Mexico is poised to fulfill ex-
President Salinas's goal of compelling "some two million families-about
three-quarters of the nation's corn farmers [to] 'search for alternatives in
other crops, reorganize their land holdings, associate with private
capitalists, or become wage laborers.""'2 But integrating Indians into the
country's urban-industrial market economy faces at least two formidable
obstacles. First, it is virtually impossible for the Mexican market economy to
absorb the millions of potentially displaced Indians. Second, there are key
social factors, akin to those confronting U.S. southern blacks as they
migrated from the rural South to the urban North, that will stunt any full and
meaningful integration of Mexico's Indians.
As it stands now, Mexico has no formal integration plan for the
displacement of its millions of Indians under NAFTA." 7 Rather, Mexico
expects that the increased agricultural and industrial exports predicted from
free trade will fuel expansion, create more jobs, and thereby absorb any
incidentally displaced citizens."' There is one significant problem with this
theory-it flies in the face of existing economic reality.
In the last several years, Mexico has increased its volume of trade in
agricultural and industrial exports.4 9 Yet not only has the number of jobs fallen
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Julio A. Montes, Mexican Armoured Vehicles, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Jan.
I, 1996, at 44.
245. See id.
246. BARRY, supra note 16, at 47.
247. See generally Mexican Agricultural policy: An Immigration Generator?, supra note
32, at 1-6.
248. See id.
.249. See Clearing Mexico's Hurdles: U.S. Exporter's Checklist, supra note 181.
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considerably, real wages for the remaining workers dropped."' For example,
between the years of 1983 to 1993, when Mexico began opening its markets to
the U.S., Mexico's real GDP achieved steady annual growth."' In fact, its volume
of exports doubled from $25.95 billion to $51.88.22 Nonetheless, those years
were marred by tremendous job losses. 3 and falling wages; between 1982 and
1993, the Mexican minimum wage fell by over 70 percent."4
There thus seems to be a direct correlation between industry productivity
and profit, on the one hand, and the increasing impoverishment of the Mexican
work force on the other. This perverse economic reality undermines the
argument that millions of Mexico's Indians can be successfully integrated,
through free trade, into the market economy. The obvious question remains:
what will become of Mexico's Indian population if U.S. corn continues to flood
the Mexican market under NAFTA's tariff-free provisions?
One model might be that of the African-American. As African-
Americans migrated out of the rural South, primarily during World War I and
especially during and after World War 11, they encountered two obstacles: 1)
a racist and inhospitable temper in the urban sectors; and 2) a lack of
training and job skills required for their new setting.5 Consequently, they
became what Michael Harrington aptly termed the "Other America," poor,
neglected, and channeled into what we now call the inner city.2"6
250. See Dornbusch & Werner, supra note 100, at 294-195.
251. Seeid. at 295.
252. See id. at 296. Exports growth under NAFTA has skyrocketed. Between 1993
and 1995, two-way trade between Mexico and the U.S. rose from $81.5 billion to $107
billion. See CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HEMISPHERIC TRADE, NAFTA AT THREE: How's IT
DOING? (Feb. 1997) <http://lanic.utexas.edu/scwht/NAFTA3.html>
253. See Dornbusch & Werner, supra note 100, at 295. Under NAFTA, the decline
in jobs continues: "According to Mexican government figures, the unemployment
rate doubled between September 1994 and September 1995. The number of workers
registered at the Mexican Social Security Institute fell by 900,000 during the first
eight months of 1995." No Laughter in NAFTA, supra note 224. "Adding to that figure all
those workers who were not registered who have lost their jobs, business leaders
estimate that over 1.5 million people have been left unemployed ... [in 19951." Id.
254. See Dornbusch & Werner, supra note 100, at 294. Wages continue to plummet
under NAFTA: "The Mexican Congress of Workers (CTM) reports that the purchasing
power of the average wage has fallen by 54 percent this year. The CTM asserts that the
real minimum wage in 1976 was 3.4 times that of 1995 and has characterized 1995 as 'the
worst [yearl we've had in our history." No Laughter in NAFTA, supra note 224.
255. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A
HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS, 291-310, 385-424 (1987).
256. See MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962).
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Much the same experience may await Mexico's Indian population if they
are economically and ethnically cleansed from their lands. Like post-bellum
African-Americans, Mexico's Indians lack the necessary training and job skills to
effectively compete in the urban economy.2"' In addition, racism directed against
Indians in Mexico is deeply-rooted and widespread." They may thus face the
one-two punch of poor preparation and racism in their forced bid to integrate.
But the situation may even prove to be worse for the Indians. Unlike
post-bellum African-Americans, many Indians in Mexico speak only their
native tongue."9 This then places a severe language barrier on their urban
integration. It is, therefore, more accurate to say that indigenous peoples in
Mexico will face three legion obstacles in their forced bid to integrate into
the global economy: inadequate training, racism, and the language barrier. It
is hard to see how any full and meaningful integration can be achieved in
these circumstances by reliance alone on free-market exports.
VI. Solutions
The ghettoization of Mexico's Indian population is not inevitable under
a free-trade regime. It is quite possible that by reforming NAFTA and rolling
back certain provisions, the U.S. and Mexico can engage in free trade and at
the same time provide for the sovereignty, dignity, and economy of Mexico's
indigenous-peasantry.
Conspicuously absent from NAFTA is the democratic process. Mexico's
Indians had no say in the development of the terms of trade under this new
treaty.2" The trade accord was simply put on a fast-track path and
commandeered through to adoption by Mexico's 60-year-old ruling party,
the PRI. To U.S. citizens, this may seem appalling-the fact that the planned
displacement of millions of families was decided upon without hearings,
community input, nothing. Any attempts at NAFTA reform must therefore
begin and end with democratization. Military intimidation and assassination
of the indigenous-peasantry and political opposition groups must stop.
Beyond democratization, there are several broad areas where reform is
also required.
First the preamble in NAFTA requires change .to reflect a more
enlightened philosophy about development. Rather than focus purely on
exports for regional prosperity,2 61 the new philosophy needs to link gross
257. See Interview with Indian refugees, in San Cristobal de Las Casas, Chiapas
(Mar-Apr. 1994) (on file with author).
258. See LA BoTz, supra note 3, at 23-24.
259. See Filmed Interview with Mayan Indians, in Chiapas, (Mar.-Apr. 1994) (on
file with author).
260. See BARRY, supra note 16, at 72.
261. See generally BARRY, supra note 19, at 113-119.
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domestic product with a gross social product. Thus, when an indicator shows
real economic trade growth, there should be a corresponding rise in a
nation's standard of living. If this does not occur, there should be provisions
to roll back or implement remedial measures to protect the living standards
of NAFTA citizens. The power to effect these remedial measures should lay
not just with individual governments, but with citizen groups as well.
Second, the NAFTA and future trade agreements of the Americas need
to have a special section that addresses indigenous rights. Issues such as
autonomy and meaningful participation in the free-trade process ought to
be covered. In no situation should a consortium of governments simply
decide to unilaterally change the productive relations of its native peoples.
Third, a Hemispheric Reconstruction Fund should be set up to deal
with economic dislocation in the wake of free trade. These monies can be
directed to the training, education, relocation and development of
dislocated individuals and communities.
Fourth, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, covering land
redistribution, rights and privileges, needs to be amended again. The
amendments in 1992, ending the state commitment to land redistribution
and permitting the privatization of ejidos, exposes vulnerable Indian
communities to possible exploitation and, perhaps, expropriation of their
lands. Article 27 should again mandate a constitutional commitment to
Mexico's Indians in the form of land redistribution.
However, the land titling and registration aspects of the 1992
amendment may b something to retain. They impose a semblance of order
on chaos in that disputes as to land boundaries can now be resolved by
reference to government titling documents. Moreover, because the
ambiguity surrounding ownership of ejido land is eliminated through the
titling process, ejidatarios may be better able to seek assistance from lending
sources, such as commercial banks, cooperatives and non-governmental
organizations.
Finally, the Mexican government needs to financially re-commit itself
to its rural poor. For instance, Indian communities require credit, technical
assistance and irrigation systems. These are the types of public works
programs that only governments can or are willing to provide. The knee-jerk
notion that a country must uphold cuts in social spending, in order to
remain globally competitive and credit worthy, simply must be abandoned.
VII. Conclusion
President Clinton has expressed hope that by the year 2005, a Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) will be established. This will include the
entire Western Hemisphere.262 However, once again, as in NAFTA, nowhere is
262. See Hon. Barbara Franklin et al. Remarks at The Heritage Foundation's
Lectures and Educational Programs (Dec. 15, 1995), http://wwwo.heritage.org/
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there discussion about what role our Hemisphere's native peoples will
play."3 What, for example, will become of the Xicaque in Honduras; the
Ngobe-Bugle of Panama; the Mapuche of Chile; or the millions of Maya
spread across Central America? In Brazil, suicide rates among the Guarani
Kaiowa have reached alarming levels due to extreme poverty, loss of
traditional religious practices, but, "above all," due to lack of land."M Will
free-trade's emphasis on land concentration exacerbate this situation?
As it stands, Latin America seems poised to integrate with the United
States and Canada, irrespective of the wishes and concerns of the tens of
million of Native Americans in our Hemisphere. The White .House has
already asked that Congress grant it the power to negotiate free trade with
Chile and other Latin American countries on a fast-track basis."
Perhaps that is fitting. It was onlly five centuries ago, after all, when
Europe's steely advocate of multinational trade, by chance, first set eyes on
the Western Hemisphere. And even then, full knowing that he stood amidst
the protean stages of global economic integration, he could not. help but
ignore the human forms before him, instead delighting in their bounty. On
that first encounter with the Arawak of the Bahama Islands, Christopher
Columbus wrote:
They ... brought us parrots and balls of cotton and spears
and many other things, which they exchanged for the glass
beads and hawk's bells. They willingly traded everything
they owned .... They were well-built, with good bodies and
handsome features .... They do not bear arms, and do not
know them, for I showed them a sword, they took it by the
edge and cut themselves out of ignorance. They have no
iron. Their spears are made of cane .... They would make
fine servants .... With fifty men we could subjugate them
all and make them do whatever we want."
heritage/library/categories/trade/lect 555. ht ml.
263. See id.
264. Indigenous Assembly Grapples with Suicides, Abya Yala News, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spt.
1995, at 5.
265. See Hon. Barbara Franklin et al., supra note 262. For more information on a
Free Trade Agreement with the Americas (FTAA), see generally Joseph A. McKinney, et
al., eds., Free Trade Area for the Americas: Issues in Economics, Trade Policy, and Law, 1995
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